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Federated learning at edge systems not only mitigates privacy concerns by keeping data localized but also leverages edge computing resources to enable real-time AI inference and decision-making. In a blockchain-based federated learning framework over edge clouds, edge servers as clients can contribute private data or computing resources to the overall training or mining task for secure model aggregation. To overcome the impractical assumption that edge servers will voluntarily join training or mining, it is crucial to design an incentive mechanism that motivates edge servers to achieve optimal training and mining outcomes. In this paper, we investigate the incentive mechanism design for a semi-asynchronous blockchain-based federated edge learning system. We model the resource pricing mechanism among edge servers and task publishers as a Stackelberg game and prove the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in such a game. We then propose an iterative algorithm based on the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) to achieve the optimal strategies for each participating edge server. Finally, our simulation results verify the convergence and efficiency of our proposed scheme.